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The Illinois Medical Studies Act and Hospital
Records: Privilege Without Substance
I. INTRODUCTION
In the wake of soaring health care costs, physician peer review
and hospital quality control procedures have become an integral
part of the health care industry.' The growth of the peer review
process, primarily intended to improve the quality of care, is in
part a result of the increase of negligence suits against hospitals.2
The Illinois Legislature, in the Medical Studies Act (the "Act"),3
confers a broad privilege upon peer review and medical research
bodies by prohibiting discovery of records generated by such bod-
ies. The Act is premised on the idea that ensuring confidentiality
of review proceedings will encourage more candid and effective
evaluation by protecting records of review activities from discovery
in civil litigation.4
Illinois courts gradually have eroded the grant of confidentiality,
however, by recognizing exceptions to the privilege.5 Although the
shield protecting the review of individual physicians has remained
relatively intact, the privilege accorded internal hospital quality
control procedures has been interpreted inconsistently. This in-
consistency has led to uncertainty as to whether a particular record
is discoverable in malpractice litigation.6 The net result is a chil-
ling effect on hospital review procedures, undermining the Act's
goal of promoting internal quality control activities.
This Comment will examine the backgroundof peer review and
the recognition by Illinois courts and the Illinois Legislature of the
need for confidentiality in review proceedings, and the construction
given the Act by Illinois courts.7 The Comment will then discuss
the judicially created exceptions to the statutory privilege, and
their effect on disclosure of hospital studies and records.8 Finally,
1. Comment, Medical Peer Review Protection in the Health Care Industry, 52 TEMP.
L.Q. 552 (1979).
2. See infra notes 10-34 and accompanying text.
3. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-2101 to 8-2105 (1987). See infra notes 35-45 and
accompanying text.
4. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-2 101 to 8-2105 (1987).
5. See infra notes 69-105 and accompanying text.
6. See infra notes 106-24 and accompanying text.
7. See infra notes 10-68 and accompanying text.
8. See infra notes 69-105 and accompanying text.
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an interpretation of the Act will be suggested which will facilitate
the uniform application of the privilege to hospital records.9
II. HOSPITAL PEER REVIEW
Courts have long recognized a hospital's independent duty to its
patients.'0 Courts have expanded a hospital's duty to maintain the
quality of care delivered within the institution by requiring not
only retrospective review of patient care, but also by requiring a
hospital to exercise care in selecting and supervising physicians on
the hospital medical staff." Hospitals have attempted to limit their
potential liability by instituting review committees to monitor the
level of care delivered. 12 This intra-hospital review, commonly
known as peer review, uses self-evaluation by medical professionals
to improve the quality and efficiency of medical procedures and
techniques. 13
The Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals (the
"JCAH") 4 requires that a hospital establish procedures for evalu-
9. See infra notes 125-39 and accompanying text.
10. Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hosp., 33 Ill. 2d 326, 211 N.E.2d
253, cert. denied 383 U.S. 946 (1965). In Darling, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that
a hospital does not merely furnish facilities; a hospital has an affirmative duty to supervise
its staff and to review the care given to patients. Id. at 332, 211 N.E.2d at 258. A failure
to do so may result in a hospital being held liable for the independent acts of its physi-
cians. This theory of a hospital's liability is commonly referred to as corporate
negligence.
11. In Pickle v. Curns, 106 Ill. App. 3d 734, 435 N.E.2d 877 (2d Dist. 1982), an
Illinois appellate court held that appointing an unqualified physician to the hospital's
medical staff constituted.a breach of the hospital's duty to its patients. Id. at 739, 435
N.E.2d at 881. A hospital is not liable for an independent physician's malpractice, how-
ever, unless the hospital had reason to know that the malpractice would occur. Id. See
also Holton v. Resurrection Hosp., 88 I1. App. 3d 655, 410 N.E.2d 969 (5th Dist. 1980)
(a hospital has the responsibility to determine the qualifications of physicians on its medi-
cal staff); Mauer v. Highland Park Hosp., 90 Ill. App. 2d 409, 232 N.E.2d 776 (2d Dist.
1967) (a hospital's right to deny staff privileges is consistent with the imposition of liabil-
ity for careless selection of staff members).
12. See, e.g., Elam v. College Park Hosp., 132 Cal. App. 3d 332, 342, 183 Cal. Rptr.
156, 161 (1982) ("[t]he hospital's duty to guard against physician's incompetency is fur-
ther implied by requiring renewal of staff privileges . . . and the periodic review of the
medical records of hospital patients"); Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99
Wis. 2d 708, 721, 301 N.W.2d 156, 169-70 (1981) ("[o]bviously, the promotion of quality
care and treatment of patients requires hospitals to perform a thorough evaluation of
medical staff applicants from the standpoint of professional competence, ethics, estab-
lished reputation, and further, to periodically review the qualifications of its staff through
a peer review or medical audit mechanism").
13. See Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 480, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (1984). For a
further discussion of Jenkins, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
14. The JCAH (now known as the Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Health-
care Organizations) is a private regulatory committee which establishes standards for
health facilities and conducts evaluations of hospitals to determine compliance with its
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ating the care rendered in the facility' 5 by identifying problems
that affect patient care, as well as opportunities for improving the
facility.' 6 This mandatory review extends to both the qualifications
of independent physicians before appointment to a hospital's medi-
cal staff, and the treatment given by those physicians while on the
medical staff.'7 The JCAH provides guidelines for hospital peer
review committees which have two primary functions: retrospec-
tive review and credentialing.1
8
Retrospective review boards evaluate the care rendered by a hos-
pital's staff physicians and recommend corrective or disciplinary
actions. '9 Retrospective review boards may be composed of several
subcommittees, each addressing a particular department or func-
tion of the hospital.2 ° JCAH standards require that retrospective
review boards meet regularly to discuss the supervision and evalua-
tion of care and that they keep records of their conclusions, actions
taken, and recommendations. 2'
Credentialing committees examine the qualifications of physi-
cians requesting admission to a hospital's staff.22  Credentialing
committees control the granting and limitation of initial staff privi-
leges,23 as well as periodic re-evaluation of physicians to determine
accreditation standards. See generally Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 487 N.E.2d 937
(1985). Pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1395x(e) (1982), JCAH accreditation of a hospital is
necessary to receive Medicare reimbursement. Medicare and Medicaid payments com-
prised 29% of all health care expenditures in 1983. See Hyman & Williamson, Fraud
and Abuse: Regulatory Alternatives in a "Competitive" Health Care Era, 19 LoY. U. CHI.
L.J. 1133, 1133 n.2 (1988) (citing Gibson, Levit, Lazenby & Waldo, National Health
Expenditures 1983, 6 HEALTH CARE FINANCING REVIEW 1 (Winter, 1984)). As a re-
sult, a hospital's failure to obtain JCAH accreditation can result in substantial financial
hardship.
15. Joint Commission on the Accreditation of Hospitals, Accreditation Manual for
Hospitals, at 217 (1987) [hereinafter JCAH Manual].
16. Id.
17. Id.
18. Merritt, The Tort Liability of Hospital Ethics Committees, 60 S. CAL. L. REV.
1239, 1256 (1987). See generally JCAH Manual, supra note 15.
19. JCAH Manual, supra note 15, at 112.
20. Id. at 283. For example, utilization review committees analyze the allocation of
resources within the hospital, such as the propriety of admissions and the necessity of
continuing stays. Id. Medical audit committees evaluate the care actually provided in
the hospital, comparing it to the state of the art and ensuring that each staff member
provides, and each patient receives, a uniform level of care. Id. at 117. Tissue or surgical
committees review the quality and necessity of surgery. Id.
21. Id. at 116.
22. Id. at 109. Staff appointment allows a private physician, although not an em-
ployee or agent of the hospital, to use hospital facilities. See Elam v. College Park Hosp.,
132 Cal App. 3d 332, 335, 183 Cal. Rptr. 156, 157 (1982).
23. JCAH Manual, supra note 15, at 110. The JCAH identifies key factors in the
credentialing process. These key factors include licensure, training and clinical experi-
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whether corrective action, such as a restriction or revocation of
privileges, is necessary.24 Not only is review required by the
JCAH, but a hospital's failure either to investigate a physician's
qualifications prior to appointment or to evaluate the care provided
exposes the hospital to liability.25  This theory of liability is pre-
mised on the hospital's duty to exercise care in the selection of its
medical staff.26
The result of both retrospective review boards and credentialing
committees is the generation of records often pertaining to a physi-
cian's incompetence or negligence.27 Access to these peer review
records facilitates a malpractice plaintiff's suit in two ways. First,
the records provide the plaintiff with recorded evidence of a physi-
cian's negligence which the plaintiff can use in a malpractice suit
against the physician. Second, the records may provide the plain-
tiff with evidence of a hospital's knowledge of the physician's in-
competence - the basis of which may permit the plaintiff to sue
the hospital under the theory of corporate negligence.2 s
The Illinois Supreme Court, however, has noted that the pur-
pose of peer review "is not to facilitate the prosecution of malprac-
tice cases."' 29 The court also has recognized the importance of
confidential communication in peer review proceedings. 3°  The
ence, competence, and a physician's health status. Id. A credentialing committee may
also consider such factors as malpractice suits filed against a physician or a physician's
loss of staff privileges at another hospital. Id.
24. Id. at 119. In renewing staff privileges, the credentialing committee may review
the physician's experience at the hospital, the results of treatment rendered by the physi-
cian, and other evidence of continuing qualification. Id.
25. See Johnson v. Misericordia Community Hosp., 99 Wis. 2d 708, 301 N.W.2d 156
(1981). In Johnson, the court held that the hospital's failure to fully investigate the quali-
fications of the plaintiff's treating physician created an unreasonable risk to the patient.
Id. at 716, 301 N.W.2d at 164.
26. Id.
27. As one author stated:
In fulfilling their duty to review the qualifications and performance of individ-
ual members of the medical staff, members of the hospital governing body, ad-
ministration, and medical staff must frequently make determinations that are
adverse to individual practitioners. In making such decisions, the information
collected or generated by the hospital's committees or administrative staff is
often such that its dissemination might damage the . affected professional.
HOSPITAL LAW MANUAL vol. IB, § 7 (1983).
28. See Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 630, 115 Cal. Rptr. 317,
320-21 (1977) ("[i]n a damage suit for in-hospital malpractice against doctor or.hospital
or both, unavailability of recorded evidence of incompetence might seriously jeopardize
or even prevent the plaintiff's recovery"). For a discussion of corporate negligence, see
supra note 10.
29. Jenkins v. Wu, 102 11. 2d 468, 479-80, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1168 (1984). For a
further discussion of Jenkins, see infra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
30. Id.
1989] Illinois Medical Studies Act
need for confidentiality can be traced to physicians' apprehension
of reprisals stemming from peer review activities.3 The physician
under review risks exposure to malpractice suits arising from the
proceedings; the threat of loss of referrals and professional respect
also may deter physicians from candid evaluations of their col-
leagues.32 In addition, disclosure of medical research or quality
control records may create a chilling effect on research sources33 or
deter hospitals from undertaking programs to appraise and im-
prove hospital procedures for fear that the results would be discov-
erable in a corporate negligence suit against the hospital.3 4
III. THE ILLINOIS MEDICAL STUDIES ACT
A. Legislative History
In response to the need for protecting peer review records, all
fifty states have enacted statutes providing at least some degree of
privilege.35 In 1961, Illinois passed a law providing for the confi-
31. Comment, supra note 1, at 558 ("doctors seem reluctant to engage in strict peer
review due to a number of apprehensions").
32. Id. See also Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168-69.
33. See Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494 (N.D. Ill. 1983). Relying on the
goal of improvement of the quality of care, the court in Andrews ruled that the data of a
study on the effects of diethylstilbestrol ("DES") were not subject to discovery. Id. at
503-04. The court reasoned that because researchers must often guarantee confidentiality
to their subjects to obtain data and because disclosure might create a chilling effect on
future research, the general research data should not be discoverable. Id. at 500, 503.
The court, however, ordered production of research data concerning the plaintiffs, con-
cluding that selective disclosure would not jeopardize the research. Id. at 504. Further-
more, the plaintiffs' previous disclosure of their own medical records indicated that they
did not consider the material to be confidential and that they did not assert any available
privilege with regard to it. Id.
34. See, e.g., Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp., 166 III. App. 3d 70, 76, 519 N.E.2d 504,
508 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 121 III. 2d 571, 526 N.E.2d 832 (1988).
35. McCann, Peer Review, Disclosure, and Reporting, Utilization Management, PROs
and Quality Assurance: The Legal Pitfalls, NHLA, at app. 5-9 (1987). At least one
court has created a common law privilege for peer review records. Bredice v. Doctors
Hosp., Inc., 50 F.R.D. 249 (D.D.C. 1970), aff'd, 479 F.2d 920 (D.C. Cir. 1973). In
Bredice, the plaintiff brought suit against a hospital, alleging malpractice that resulted in
the death of her husband. In the course of discovery, the plaintiff requested hospital
committee reports relating to her husband's death, and reports from the hospital to its
malpractice insurer. Id. at 249-50. The court denied discovery of the committee records,
noting the importance of openness in peer review proceedings to the improvement of
medical procedures and patient care. Id. at 250. The court stated:
Candid and conscientious evaluation of clinical practices is a sine qua non of
adequate hospital care. To subject these discussions and deliberations to the
discovery process, without a showing of exceptional necessity, would result in
terminating such deliberations. Constructive professional criticism cannot oc-
cur in an atmosphere of apprehension that one doctor's suggestion will be used
as a denunciation of a colleague's conduct in a malpractice suit.
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dentiality of certain medical records.36 The Illinois Medical Stud-
ies Act (the "Act") 37 was intended to improve the quality of health
care by encouraging participation in and institution of quality con-
trol procedures, and fostering "full, frank, and complete communi-
cation" within the reviewing body.38 The legislature realized that
without an assurance of confidentiality, the open communication
necessary for effective review would be hampered.39
The extent of the privilege, like the protected activities and
records, has been expanded since the original enactment.' The
current Act's predecessor 4 prohibited only the introduction of
peer review and quality control records into evidence; the discov-
ery of the records nevertheless was permitted. The Act was
amended in 1982 to prohibit the discovery of review records, abro-
gating an appellate court decision in Walker v. Alton Memorial
Hospital.42
The Act currently reads in pertinent part:
Id. The court concluded that unless the plaintiff could show exceptional need for the
records, the overwhelming public interest in improving patient care overrode the need for
disclosure. Id. See also Gillman v. United States, 53 F.R.D. 316 (S.D.N.Y. 1971).
36. 1961 Ill. Laws 3721-22. The law provided that:
All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or other data of
.in-hospital staff committees of accredited hospitals, but not the original
medical records pertaining to the patient, used in the course of medical study
for the purpose of reducing morbidity or mortality shall be strictly confidential
and shall be used only for medical research.
Such information, records, reports, statements, notes, memoranda, or other
data, shall not ho admissible as evidence in any action of any kind ....
1961 I1l. Laws 3721.
37. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, paras. 8-2101 to 8-2105 (1987).
38. HOUSE FLOOR DEBATE, 82d I11. Gen. Assem. (May 17, 1981).
39. Id.
40. For instance, the internal quality control activities of hospitals were brought
within the scope of the act in 1976. P.A. No. 79-1434, § 4.
41. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 51, para. 101 (1979).
42. 91 111. App. 3d 310, 414 N.E.2d 850 (5th Dist. 1981); HOUSE FLOOR DEBATE,
82d I11. Gen. Assem. (May 17, 1981). In Walker, the plaintiff filed a malpractice suit and
requested the defendant hospital to answer interrogatories regarding the review of the
plaintiff's treatment. The requested records included the identities of participants, the
substance of their discussions, and the results of the proceeding. Walker, 91 111. App. 3d
at 311, 414 N.E.2d at 851. The court ordered disclosure, reasoning that the potential
inadmissibility of the records did not prohibit discovery. Id. at 314, 414 N.E.2d at 852.
But see Mennes v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 100 I11. App. 3d 1029, 427 N.E.2d
952 (1st Dist. 1981). In Mennes, the court, interpreting the same statute, reached a differ-
ent result. The court noted that the Act protected material used for internal quality
control or determination of staff privileges. Id. at 1032-33, 427 N.E.2d at 953. The court
therefore denied the plaintiff's requests for all of the defendant hospital's information
regarding the allegedly negligent staff appointment of two physicians. Id. In denying
discovery, the court reasoned that "if all staff appointment material could be obtained
and used against the hospital whenever a plaintiff urged a negligent staff appointment
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All information, interviews, reports, statements, memoranda or
other data of ... allied medical societies, . . .or committees of
licensed or accredited hospitals or their medical staffs, including
Patient Care Audit Committees, Medical Care Evaluation Com-
mittees, Utilization Review Committees, Credential Committees
and Executive Committees, (but not the medical records pertain-
ing to the patient), used in the course of internal quality control
or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbidity or
mortality, or for improving patient care, shall be privileged,
strictly confidential and shall be used only for medical research,
the evaluation and improvement of quality care, or granting, lim-
iting or revoking staff privileges . ..."
The Act, by its terms, protects the records of state and municipal
health departments, health maintenance organizations, and review
committees of licensed or accredited hospitals. 44 The privileged
records include those used in internal quality control or to reduce
incidence of death or disease; 45 however, it has been left to the
courts to determine whether a specific reviewing committee or a
particular record is covered by the Act.
B. Illinois Courts' Interpretation of the Act
The Illinois Supreme Court, ruling on the constitutionality of
the amended Act in Jenkins v. Wu, 46 found that the Act is ration-
ally related to the state's interest in improving the quality of health
care through the peer review process and, therefore, does not vio-
theory, the statutory goal of candid commentary would be compromised." Id. at 1031,
427 N.E.2d at 953.
43. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987).
44. Id.
45. Id. The statutes of most other states similarly are interpreted as intending to
improve medical care, to reduce disease and death, and to promote medical research. See
McCann, supra note 35, at 5-9. The underlying rationale of a privilege is that it will
encourage candid evaluation of medical care by allowing physicians to serve on review
boards without fear of reprisal.
The scope of the peer review privilege varies from state to state and may be limited to
reviewing bodies which have a certain number of licensed practitioners, or which perform
specific activities. See, e.g., COLo. REV. STAT. § 12-43.5-102 (1973 & Supp. 1984); IND.
CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988); KAN. STAT. ANN. § 65-4915
(1985); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 537.035 (Vernon Supp. 1985); N.Y. EDUC. LAW § 6527 (Mc-
Kinney 1989). The extent of the privilege varies as well; some statutes prohibit discovery
altogether, while others permit disclosure upon a showing of extraordinary necessity.
See, e.g., D.C. CODE ANN. § 32-505 (1981); FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40 (West Supp.
1984); NEB. REV. STAT. § 49.265 (1981); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (Supp. 1985); PA.
STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 (Purdon Supp. 1984-85); VA. CODE ANN. § 8.01-581.17
(1984).
46. 102 Il1. 2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984).
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late equal protection.47 In Jenkins, which involved a malpractice
suit against a physician, the plaintiff requested the personnel file of
the physician, committee reports regarding the quality of care pro-
vided by him, and a general search of hospital files, including re-
view committee reports.4 " The court upheld the trial court's
decision to quash discovery of the records, 9 acknowledging not
only the importance of internal review to the quality of care, but
also the need for a privilege protecting review activities.5 °
One year after Jenkins, the Illinois Supreme Court in Niven v.
Siqueira51 expanded the scope of the Act to cover any legitimate
medical society's studies and programs, so long as they are in-
tended to improve hospital conditions and patient care, and to re-
duce death and disease rates.52 In Niven, the plaintiff brought a
malpractice action against his physician, claiming that several op-
erations were performed negligently. The plaintiff further alleged
that the co-defendant hospital was negligent in granting the physi-
cian staff privileges. 3 During discovery, the plaintiff requested
documents from the JCAH relating to the hospital's accredita-
tion. 54 The court quashed discovery of the JCAH evaluation, rul-
ing that the JCAH fell within the meaning of "allied medical
society" and, therefore, was a privileged entity under the Act.5
The court concluded that the JCAH materials, used as part of a
program to improve the quality of health care, were protected by
47. Id. at 482, 468 N.E.2d at 1169. Although peer review records are not discovera-
ble in malpractice actions, the privilege is inapplicable to requests made by a physician
contesting a committee's decision. See Matviuw v. Johnson, 70 Ill. App. 3d 481, 388
N.E.2d 795 (1st Dist. 1979). In Matviuw, the plaintiff physician's cause of action for
defamation was based on statements allegedly made during a peer review proceeding.
The court allowed disclosure of the statements, reasoning that the Act does not provide
an absolute privilege which would have foreclosed the plaintiff's civil action entirely. Id.
at 487, 388 N.E.2d at 798-99.
48. Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 473, 468 N.E.2d at 1165.
49. Id. at 482, 468 N.E.2d at 1169.
50. Id. at 479-80, 468 N.E.2d at 1168. The court stated that the purpose of the Act
is:
To ensure the effectiveness of professional self-evaluation, by members of the
medical profession, in the interest of improving the quality of health care. The
Act is premised on the belief that, absent the statutory peer-review privilege,
physicians would be reluctant to sit on peer-review committees and engage in
frank evaluations of their colleagues.
Id. at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
51. 109 I11. 2d 357, 487 N.E.2d 937 (1985).
52. Id. at 366, 487 N.E.2d at 942.
53. Id. at 361, 487 N.E.2d at 939.
54. Id. at 361-62, 487 N.E.2d at 940.
55. Id. at 366-67, 487 N.E.2d at 942.
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the Act.56
The court thus extended the privilege to groups not specifically
named or described in the statute, but whose activities and pur-
poses were of the evaluative nature contemplated by the legislature
in granting the privilege. 7 The court, however, observed that the
question of whether particular materials are within the scope of the
Act is a question of fact, which can be determined through an evi-
dentiary hearing concerning the contested records. 8
An appellate court in Sakosko v. Memorial Hospital59 further
expanded the privilege applicable to hospital records. The court
concluded that although the information collected by a hospital
infection committee was not used exclusively for internal quality
control, medical study, or improving patient care, it was still privi-
leged.' In Sakosko, the plaintiffs alleged that because of the hospi-
tal's negligence, they contracted infections following surgery. 6'
During discovery, the plaintiffs requested pathology reports of tests
performed to determine the source of their infections and a report
by a consulting infection expert.62 The tests and reports had been
ordered by the hospital's environmental services committee, whose
function was to evaluate and control infection.63 The court ruled
that because the infection committee was established to maintain
the level of quality and to improve patient care,' its records and
reports regarding the plaintiffs' infections were protected by the
Act. 6
5
Thus, Illinois courts have acknowledged the need for confidenti-
ality in quality control and peer review activities. Courts have
quashed attempts to discover hospital evaluations,66 credentialing
56. Id. at 367, 487 N.E.2d at 942. JCAH policy requires that all information regard-
ing the accreditation process, including results and recommendations, be released only to
the hospital unless hospital conditions pose a threat to public safety. JCAH Manual,
supra note 15, at xxiii.
57. Niven, 109 Il. 2d at 367, 487 N.E.2d at 942.
58. Id. at 368, 487 N.E.2d at 943.
59. 167 Il1. App. 3d 842, 522 N.E.2d 273 (5th Dist. 1988).
60. Id. at 845, 522 N.E.2d at 275.
61. Id. at 843-44, 522 N.E.2d at 274.
62. Id. at 844, 522 N.E.2d at 275.
63. Id. at 844-45, 522 N.E.2d at 275.
64. Id.
65. Id. at 845, 522 N.E.2d at 276. The court also noted that the hospital's later
disclosure of the records to its risk manager did not constitute a waiver of the privilege.
Id.
66. Niven v. Siqueira, 109 II1. 2d 357. 366, 487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (1985); Sakosko, 167
I11. App. 3d at 846, 522 N.E.2d at 276.
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records,67 and retrospective review of the care rendered by a physi-
cian.68 The privilege, however, is not absolute. Recently, the
courts have begun to carve away at the broad interpretations and
applications of the Act.
IV. EXCEPTIONS TO THE PRIVILEGE
The Act itself provides certain exceptions to the general privilege
covering peer review activities.69 The Act, however, is silent as to
the extent of the privilege in a negligence suit.70 In an effort to
facilitate discovery, Illinois courts have begun to carve out excep-
tions to the broad grant of privilege conferred by the Act.
In Gleason v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center,71 an Illinois appellate
court held that the results of a peer review proceeding were outside
the scope of the privilege. 72 The plaintiff, alleging negligent super-
vision of her treating physician, served interrogatories requesting
the defendant hospital to disclose the actions it took to supervise or
restrict the co-defendant physician's staff privileges.7 3 Because the
statute, by its express terms, protects only "information, inter-
views, reports, statements, memoranda, or other data," the court
ordered the hospital to answer the interrogatories and to disclose
the names of persons who provided information regarding the doc-
tor prior to his appointment.74 Although the court acknowledged
that the statutory goal, as determined in Jenkins v. Wu, 7" was to
improve the quality of care by encouraging candid self-evaluation,
the court limited the privilege, stating:
While virtually every action of a doctor or hospital could, in
some sense, arguably be connected to something that was said,
67. Mennes v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 1032, 427
N.E.2d 952, 953 (lst Dist. 1981).
68. Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 482, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1169 (1984).
69. The statute allows disclosure of peer review records in a suit brought by the phy-
sician under review which challenges an adverse decision regarding staff privileges or
alleging bad faith or malice on the part of the reviewing committee. See ILL. REV. STAT.
ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987).
70. In Jenkins, the Illinois Supreme Court upheld the exception for the physician
under review, holding that it does not deny equal protection to the malpractice plaintiff.
Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 482, 468 N.E.2d at 1169. The court, however, did not reach the
issue of the extent of the privilege in malpractice suits beyond acknowledging the pa-
tient's access to her own records. Id. at 479, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
71. 135 Ill. App. 3d 92, 481 N.E.2d 780 (5th Dist. 1985).
72. Id. at 95, 481 N.E.2d at 781.
73. Id.
74. Id.
75. 102 Ill. 2d 468, 468 N.E.2d 1162 (1984). For a further discussion of Jenkins, see
supra notes 46-50 and accompanying text.
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done, or recorded at a peer review session, the statute evinces a
legislative intent to shield the review process itself, and not ac-
tions later taken in consequence of that process.76
In Richter v. Diamond," the Illinois Supreme Court confirmed
the Gleason interpretation, holding that results of a peer review
proceeding were outside the scope of the Act." In Richter, the
plaintiff brought a malpractice action against her physicians and a
claim against the hospital, alleging negligent supervision of the
medical staff.7 9 The plaintiff served interrogatories on the hospital,
requesting information concerning restrictions on the defendant
physician's staff appointment.8 ° The court ordered the hospital to
answer the interrogatories, reasoning that the policy underlying
the statutory privilege - the promotion of candid review - ap-
plied only to the credentialing proceedings themselves.8 ' The court
further noted that disclosure of the results of peer review would
not inhibit the candor intended by the legislature.82
Likewise, because disclosure would not impair open discussion
during review, Illinois courts allow discovery of information from
an independent source, originating outside the peer review pro-
ceeding. In Jenkins, the court conceded that although a review
board's records concerning the defendant physician are privileged,
the Act provides the plaintiff with full access to her own records
and also that she can depose persons involved in her treatment.8 3
Similarly, the Gleason court held that the defendant hospital must
disclose the identities of persons who provided information relating
76. Gleason, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 95, 481 N.E.2d at 781. Although the Act is silent,
several states expressly provide for disclosure of the results of a review proceeding. See,
e.g., ARIz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 36-445.01 (1986) (in a case brought against a hospital for
failure to do adequate review, a hospital representative may testify as to whether there
was review of the subject matter of the suit); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West 1983
& Supp. 1988) (hospital administration may disclose action taken concerning a staff phy-
sician); IDAHO CODE § 39-1392e (1985) (plaintiff may discover whether an inquiry was
conducted and whether any action will be taken).
77. 108 Ill. 2d 265, 483 N.E.2d 1256 (1985).
78. Id. at 270, 483 N.E.2d at 1258.
79. Id. at 266, 483 N.E.2d at 1256.
80. Id. at 267, 483 N.E.2d at 1257.
81. Id. at 270, 483 N.E.2d at 1258.
82. Id. at 269, 483 N.E.2d at 1258. The court also distinguished the situation from
that in Mennes v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 100 II1. App. 3d 1029, 427 N.E.2d
952 (1st Dist. 1981). In Mennes, the information requested (all material regarding staff
privileges) clearly included privileged information; accordingly, discovery was denied.
Id. at 1031, 427 N.E.2d at 953.
83. Jenkins, 102 I11. 2d at 479, 468 N.E.2d at 1168. See also Sanderson v. Frank S.
Bryan M.D, Ltd., 361 Pa. Super. 491, 522 A.2d 1138 (1987) (court denied discovery of
peer review records, reasoning that the plaintiff would have access to his own records and
to persons with first-hand knowledge of his treatment).
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to the physician before staff privileges were granted.84 Thus,
merely introducing independent information in a review proceed-
ing does not render the information privileged.8"
More recently, in Willing v; St. Joseph Hospital,86 an Illinois ap-
pellate court held that a physician's application material and the
modification of his staff privileges fall outside the protection of the
Act.87 In Willing, the plaintiff brought a malpractice suit, alleging
that the defendant hospital negligently granted surgical privileges
to the co-defendant physician."' During discovery, the plaintiff re-
quested information concerning the extent of the physician's staff
privileges.8 9 The plaintiff also served subpoenas on five non-party
hospitals, requesting production of all credentials files and appoint-
ment materials maintained on the physician.90
The court ordered the non-party hospitals to produce the physi-
cian's application materials91 and to disclose any modification of
his staff privileges. 92 The court determined that the physician had
voluntarily submitted the application materials to the credentials
committees and that the application did not originate in a peer re-
view proceeding. Therefore, the court concluded that disclosure
would not breach the confidentiality of the proceedings themselves
or hinder the effective self-evaluation contemplated by the legisla-
ture. 93 The court, following the Niven standard, concluded that
84. Gleason, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 95, 481 N.E.2d at 781.
85. Generally, statutes which provide for disclosure of information from an in-
dependent source explain that information otherwise obtainable is not privileged merely
because it was introduced in peer review proceedings. Independent sources may testify as
to matters within their knowledge, but not regarding their testimony before a review
committee. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 768.40 (West 1986); GA. CODE ANN. §§ 84-
7604, 88-3204 (Supp. 1984); IND. CODE ANN. § 34-4-12.6-2 (West 1983 & Supp. 1988);
IOWA CODE ANN. § 147.135 (West 1972); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 311.377 (Michie/
Bobbs-Merrill 1983); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 131E-95 (Supp. 1985); OHIO REV. CODE ANN.
§ 2305.24 (Anderson 1983); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 63, § 425.4 (Purdon Supp. 1984); Wis.
STAT. ANN. § 146.38 (West Supp. 1988). See also Hallowell v. Jove, 247 Ga. 678, 279
S.E.2d 430 (1981) (information from an independent source is not subject to the privilege
by virtue of its introduction in a peer review meeting); Byork v. Carmer, 109 A.D.2d
1087, 487 N.Y.S.2d 226 (1985) (defendant hospital must disclose information regarding
previous negligent actions of the physician because there are other ways the hospital
could have learned of the negligence outside of a peer review proceeding).
86. 176 Ill. App. 3d 737, 531 N.E.2d 824 (1st Dist. 1988).
87. .r4 at 744, 531 N.E.2d at 828.
88. Id. at 739, 531 N.E.2d at 825.
89. Id. at 739, 531 N.E.2d at 826.
90. Id. at 740, 531 N.E.2d at 826.
91. Id. The requested materials included previous evaluations, recommendations,
and transcripts. Id.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 743-44, 531 N.E.2d at 828. The defendant hospital also contended that
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the applicability of the privilege to a contested record was to be
decided through in camera examination, thus allowing the court to
determine whether continued confidentiality of the record was
necessary.9
Finally, in Marsh v. Lake Forest Hospital,95 an Illinois appellate
court concluded that certain tests initiated by the defendant hospi-
tal's administration for internal quality control were outside the
scope of the Act. 96 After the death of his wife in the hospital, the
plaintiff brought a malpractice suit. During discovery, the plain-
tiff's attorney learned that the decedent's medical records had been
altered at some time after her death.97 Furthermore, the hospital
had ordered polygraph tests to determine whether any of the
nurses who attended the patient were responsible for the
alteration.9"
The hospital argued that the polygraph tests had been initiated
for the purpose of internal quality control and to improve patient
care, and thus were privileged. The court rejected this contention,
stating that "[t]he purpose of the Act is not to shield hospitals
from potential liability. The problem of finding doctors to serve on
peer-review committees, noted in Jenkins, is not present where the
investigation is undertaken by the hospital administration." 99
Although conceding that the hospital did have an interest in dis-
covering whether nurses had changed patient records, the court
pointed out that nurses, unlike doctors, are not appointed to or
removed from staff positions through a peer review process. 100 The
court held that the records were not privileged under the Act, rea-
soning that the polygraph tests were unrelated to the peer review
process and that withholding the results did not further the legisla-
records of restrictions placed on the physician's staff privileges following the alleged mal-
practice constituted evidence of subsequent remedial measures and, therefore, were inad-
missible at trial to show negligence. Id. at 744, 531 N.E.2d at 829. The court agreed, but
observed that inadmissibility of evidence at trial did not necessarily preclude discovery of
the materials. Id.
94. Id.
95. 166 Ill. App. 3d 70, 519 N.E.2d 504 (2d Dist.), appeal denied, 121 11. 2d 571, 526
N.E.2d 832 (1988).
96. Id. at 76, 519 N.E.2d at 508-09. Most states do not extend the privilege to hospi-
tal administration records. See Humana Hosp. Desert Valley v. Superior Court, 154
Ariz. 396, 742 P.2d 1352 (1987); Matchett v. Superior Court, 40 Cal. App. 3d 623, 115
Cal. Rptr. 317 (1974); Anderson v. Breda, 103 Wash. 2d 901, 700 P.2d 737 (1985). Other
jurisdictions have ordered disclosure of board of trustees records. See Shelton v.
Morehead Memorial Hosp., 318 N.C. 76, 347 S.E.2d 824 (1986).
97. Marsh, 166 Ill. App. 3d at 72, 519 N.E.2d at 506.
98. Id.
99. Id. at 76, 519 N.E.2d at 508-09.
100. Id.
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tive purpose of encouraging physician participation on review
boards. "oI
Illinois courts, therefore, have carved out exceptions to the privi-
lege granted by the legislature. Concluding that disclosure would
not hinder the self-evaluation process, courts have ordered discov-
ery of the results of peer review proceedings, 10 2 information from
independent sources, 103 staff appointment application materials, 10 4
and the results of internal hospital investigations. 15 Only one ex-
ception to the privilege, allowing disclosure of records pertaining
to the patient's treatment, is expressly authorized by the Act. The
remainder have been created by judicial interpretation of the intent
of the legislature in codifying the privilege.
V. APPLICATIONS OF THE MEDICAL STUDIES ACT TO
HOSPITAL RECORDS
The more restrictive readings of the Medical Studies Act, such
as that in Marsh v. Lake Forest Hospital, represent a departure
from the legislative purpose underlying the Act. In addition, the
judicial exceptions to the statutory privilege have emphasized the
protection of the physician, rather than the hospital. 106 For exam-
ple, the privilege granted to the credentialing process has remained
fairly intact; for the most part, only the consequences of a creden-
tialing committee's decision are subject to discovery.107 The
credentialing committee, as well as other physician review boards,
is clearly identified as a protected entity in the Act,108 and its activ-
101. Id. at 76, 519 N.E.2d at 508. But see Andrews v. Eli Lilly & Co., 97 F.R.D. 494,
500 (N.D. Ill. 1983). The Andrews court rejected the contention that the Medical Studies
Act was applicable only to physician peer review; while assuring confidentiality of the
review process was one purpose of the statute, there was no statutory or judicial require-
ment that the privilege protect only material relating to peer review. Id.
102. Richter, 108 I11. 2d at 270, 483 N.E.2d at 1258; Gleason v. St. Elizabeth Medical
Center, 135 Ill. App. 3d 92, 95, 481 N.E.2d 780, 781 (5th Dist. 1985).
103. Gleason, 135 Ill. App. 3d at 95, 481 N.E.2d at 781.
104. Willing, 176 Ill. App. 3d at 744, 531 N.E.2d at 828.
105. Marsh, 166 I11. App. 3d at 72. 519 N.E.2d at 506.
106. See supra notes 69-105 and accompanying text.
107. See Richter v. Diamond, 108 Ill. 2d 265, 483 N.E.2d 1256 (1985). Accord
Brown v. Superior Court, 168 Cal. App. 3d 489, 214 Cal. Rptr. 266 (1985). In Brown, the
court observed that disclosure of the fact of evaluation could be to the advantage of the
defendant hospital in a negligent supervision suit. While not inhibiting candor in the peer
review proceedings themselves, revealing that the physician was evaluated before ap-
pointment could show that the hospital took reasonable care in the selection of staff phy-
sicians. Id. at 501. 214 Cal. Rptr. at 274.
108. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987). The statute specifically mentions
patient audit, medical care, utilization, credentialing, and executive committees.
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ities are relatively regular. 10 9
On the other hand, the Act only vaguely defines the privilege
applicable to hospital records, aside from those generated by physi-
cian peer review boards."' Although the credentialing process is
fairly uniform and recognizable, a hospital study may take one of
several forms - from the JCAH evaluation in Niven v. Siqueira I
to the polygraph tests in Marsh or the pathology review in Sakosko
v. Memorial Hospital." 2 The Marsh court observed that "the pur-
pose of the Act is not to shield the hospital from liability."' 1 3 In
creating the privilege, however, the Illinois Legislature envisioned
protection for both physician peer review and hospital quality con-
trol committees as a means to achieving improved medical care.1 4
As the supreme court recognized in Jenkins v. Wu, the intention is
to encourage health care providers to undertake self-evaluation
and studies without the fear of incurring liability as a result." 5
Although the shortage of physicians willing to participate on peer
review committees may have precipitated enactment of the statu-
tory privilege, 16 the Act was drafted and amended to include hos-
pitals and other medical bodies. The legislature recognized that
more than a physician peer review privilege was necessary to im-
prove the quality and reduce the cost of health care. 'I This intent
underlying the Act generally has guided the Illinois courts in deter-
mining whether particular records or information fall within its
109. The JCAH considers regular meetings of medical review committees a key fac-
tor in its determination of accreditation. JCAH Manual, supra note 15, at 116.
110. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987). The statute protects records of
"committees of licensed or accredited hospitals or their medical staffs ...used in the
course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of reducing morbid-
ity or mortality, or for improving patient care." Id. Contra MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch.
111, § 205 (West 1985) (records of hospital risk management and quality assurance pro-
grams are expressly granted the privilege accorded to medical peer review committees).
111. 109 I11. 2d 357, 487 N.E.2d 937 (1985).
112. 167 Ill. App. 3d 842, 522 N.E.2d 273 (5th Dist. 1988).
113. Marsh, 166 I11. App. 3d at 76, 519 N.E.2d at 508.
114. Jenkins v. Wu, 102 Ill. 2d 468, 482, 468 N.E.2d 1162, 1169 (1984). The court
stated:
[The legislature] wanted to give protection to the various health providers in the
state with the focus upon the medical profession and doctors. And also, to
better supervise the health providers in a hope that we could increase or im-
prove not only the quality of care, but lower the cost of medical health care in
the state.
Id. (quoting HOUSE FLOOR DEBATE, 79th Ill. Gen. Assem. (June 11, 1976)). The Act
was amended at that time to include hospital quality control procedures, in addition to
reports of peer review committees and health departments.
115. Jenkins, 102 II1. 2d at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
116. Id.
117. Id. at 482, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
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protection." 8 In Jenkins, the supreme court concluded that the
Act's purpose is "to ensure the effectiveness of self-evaluation, by
members of the medical profession, in the interest of improving the
quality of health care."'9
While the facts of Jenkins concern the peer review evaluation of
a particular physician, 20 the Act extends the privilege to commit-
tees that monitor the quality of care provided by the hospital, as
well as those established to grant, limit, or revoke staff appoint-
ments.' 2' Because of the infection committee's purpose of quality
control, the court in Sakosko conferred a broad privilege upon its
findings and records.1 22 This construction of the privilege follows
the Niven court's protection of candid and voluntary studies to im-
prove hospital conditions. It seems, however, to conflict with a
limitation imposed by the Act itself: that the privilege not extend
to the patient's own records.2 3 The Sakosko court reasoned that
the plaintiffs' causes of action did not depend on the privileged in-
formation. Even though the information regarding the plaintiffs'
infections was not the basis of the litigation, the explicit statutory
exception for a patient's own records was applicable. 24
VI. IMPACT
The conflicting decisions of Sakosko and Marsh illustrate the ex-
tremes in construing the Act. Both interpretations, however, lose
sight of not only the legislative intent underlying the privilege, but
also the express provisions of the statute itself. The broad privilege
granted by the court in Sakosko potentially disregards the excep-
tion allowing the patient access to her own records. The Marsh
court's reading of the Act, restricting the purpose of the privilege
118. See supra notes 46-68 and accompanying text.
119. Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
120. Id.
121. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987). The statute protects information
"used in the course of internal quality control or of medical study for the purpose of
reducing morbidity or mortality, or for improving patient care." See Niven v. Siqueira,
109 Il1. 2d 357, 487 N.E.2d 937 (1985).
122. Sakosko, 167 Il. App. 3d at 845, 522 N.E.2d at 275. The court, in fact, noted
that the legislature has repeatedly amended the Medical Studies Act and expanded the
privilege with each amendment. Id.
123. In Jenkins, the court conceded that the Act allows discovery of the plaintiff's
own medical records; this exception preserved the plaintiff's ability to effectively main-
tain a cause of action. Jenkins, 102 Ill. 2d at 480, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
124. See id. Moreover, the statute, as originally drafted, provided for disclosure of
only the "original medical records pertaining to the patient." The word "original" was
deleted by amendment in 1981.
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to "finding doctors to serve on peer review committees,"'' 25 renders
much of the statute meaningless. It ignores the provisions in the
statute protecting information relating to medical research or
study, and records of privileged entities such as departments of
health or medical societies, that do not use the peer review pro-
cess. 126 The Marsh court noted that the legislative purpose of the
Act was absent in investigations undertaken by the hospital admin-
istration. 12  Following that analysis, any hospital quality control
proceeding, therefore, could fall outside the scope of the privi-
lege. 128 The net effect of decisions such as Marsh is to expose a
hospital to liability in situations where a physician would be pro-
tected. The narrow construction applied in Marsh could not only
deter hospitals from voluntarily instituting quality control pro-
grams,' 29 but also create a chilling effect on valuable research in-
tended to improve public health.'30
Perhaps the best solution, short of amending the Act to define
more precisely the boundaries of the privilege, is to follow the stan-
dard articulated in Niven: extend the privilege to voluntary studies
and programs undertaken by the hospital to improve the condi-
tions and the quality of care it provides.' 3' Such a guideline en-
compasses both physician peer review and the hospital's internal
quality control, and minimizes the inconsistency of application in
the retrospective review situation.
Furthermore, the privilege would not necessarily insulate the
hospital from liability or destroy a malpractice plaintiff's case. 1 32
The Niven court acknowledged that although the existence of a
privilege is a matter of law, the applicability of the privilege to par-
ticular records was an issue of fact to be resolved through an evi-
125. Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp., 166 Ill. App. 3d 70, 76, 519 N.E.2d 504, 508-09
(2d Dist. 1988).
126. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987). See also Andrews v. Eli Lilly &
Co., 97 F.R.D. 494, 500 (N.D. 11. 1983). The Andrews court noted that the Medical
Studies Act was not limited to physician peer review, but extended the privilege to medi-
cal research records as well. Id.
127. Marsh, 166 I1. App. 3d at 76, 519 N.E.2d at 508-09.
128. See generally JCAH Manual, supra note 15. JCAH standards indicate that
maintaining the quality of care is within the duties of the governing body of the hospital.
Id. at 49. Moreover, findings of quality assurance investigations are a factor in peer re-
view activities such as the reappointment of staff physicians. Id. at 217.
129. See Niven v. Siqueira, 109 Ill. 2d 357, 366, 487 N.E.2d 937, 942 (1985).
130. See Andrews, 97 F.R.D. at 500 (disclosure of research data would cause sources
of information to dry up).
131. Niven, 109 I1. 2d at 366, 487 N.E.2d at 942.
132. See Jenkins, 102 Il. 2d at 479, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
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dentiary hearing.'33 An in camera inspection, viewing contested
records in light of the legislative goal, also would allow the court to
determine whether confidentiality is essential to preserve the integ-
rity of the hospital quality control study. 3 4 Protecting only that
information requiring confidentiality would avoid the sweeping
privilege granted in Sakosko. Acknowledging the hospital's motive
to improve the care it provides would prevent the restricted privi-
lege recognized in Marsh. If necessary, the court may redact un-
discoverable information or material that would jeopardize the
purposes of the research.'35
Even if discovery of hospital records is quashed, the plaintiff's
case need not suffer. Patients may, by the terms of the Act, obtain
those records pertaining to their own treatment, 36 or may discover
information from those who participated in the treatment. They
may retain experts to evaluate the care rendered by the hospital. 37
In negligent supervision actions, plaintiffs may discover what ac-
tions were taken by the peer review committee. Moreover, plain-
tiffs may discover the identities of persons who provided
information to the review board prior to the physician's appoint-
ment 31 to determine whether the hospital exercised care in grant-
ing staff privileges to the physician.
VII. CONCLUSION
The legislature, in passing the Medical Studies Act, intended to
promote self-evaluation by health care providers by protecting the
review process from discovery in negligence actions. Illinois courts
133. Niven, 109 Ill. 2d at 368, 487 N.E.2d at 943. See also Walker v. Alton Memo-
rial Hosp., 91 Ill. App. 3d 310, 414 N.E.2d 850 (5th Dist. 1981), discussed supra at note
42 and accompanying text. In Walker, the court determined that in camera inspection of
disputed records would preserve the confidentiality of materials subject to the privilege.
Id. at 314, 414 N.E.2d at 852.
134. See Mennes v. South Chicago Community Hosp., 100 Ill. App. 3d 1029, 427
N.E.2d 952 (1st Dist. 1981). The court held that because the material requested was
clearly within the scope of the Medical Studies Act, an in camera inspection was not
necessary to determine the discoverability of the records. Id. at 1032, 427 N.E.2d at 953.
135. The court in Sakosko did examine the requested documents in camera; however,
the court held all information contained in the reports to be privileged, rather than re-
dacting records of patients other than the plaintiffs. Sakosko, 167 Ill. App. 3d at 844,
846, 522 N.E.2d at 274, 276. While the Marsh court noted the availability of in camera
inspection, there is no indication that the polygraph results were examined in any way.
Marsh v. Lake Forest Hosp., 166 Ill. App. 3d 70, 75, 519 N.E.2d 504, 508 (2d Dist.),
appeal denied, 121 Ill. 2d 571, 526 N.E.2d 832 (1988).
136. ILL. REV. STAT. ch. 110, para. 8-2101 (1987).
137. Jenkins, 102 Il. 2d at 479, 468 N.E.2d at 1168.
138. Gleason v. St. Elizabeth Medical Center, 135 Ill. App. 3d 92, 95, 481 N.E.2d
780, 781 (5th Dist. 1985).
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have since carved out exceptions to the privilege in an effort to
balance the legislative goal of improved health care with the judi-
cial goal of liberal discovery. These exceptions have preserved the
privilege of physician peer review proceedings and records. The
privilege, however, has been applied inconsistently to hospital
records and quality control studies. Although the disclosure of
such records may not necessarily expose the hospital to malprac-
tice or negligent supervision suits, the enhanced potential for liabil-
ity may create a chilling effect on research or evaluation programs
which depend on candor for effectiveness. Uncertainty as to the
scope of the privilege conferred by the Act might well deter a hos-
pital from initiating the kind of evaluation that the statute was in-
tended to promote.
The Illinois Legislature intended to encourage voluntary studies
as well as peer review - although not at the expense of a patient's
cause of action. More vigorous in camera inspection of the re-
quested records would serve two interests: (1) that of advancing
the quality of health care; and (2) that of recognizing the plaintiff's
need for pertinent information. By reviewing and, if appropriate,
redacting disputed material, the court could preserve the integrity
of the hospital studies and allow disclosure of information to which
confidentiality is not essential. Until a uniform privilege is estab-
lished, hospitals may approach internal quality control with the
same caution as if there were no privilege at all.
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